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The Protection of Newspaper Comment

On Public Men and Public Matters
L~on R. Yankwich*

Article 18 of the Belgian Constitution reads:
"The press is free; censorship shall never be established;
no bond or guarantee shall be required on the part of writers,
editors or printers. When the author is known and lives in
Belgium, the editor, publisher or distributor cannot be proceeded against." 1
Dicey, the English constitutionalist, commenting, in the early
part of the century, on the special immunity which this provision
conferred, contrasted it with the absence of such immunity in
English law, as involving
"a recognition of special rights on the part of persons connected with the press which is quite inconsistent with the
general theory of English law."
He added:
"It is hardly an exaggeration to say, from this point of view,
that liberty of the press is not recognized in England." 2
And he referred, not quite approvingly, to the tendency to relieve
newspapers of responsibility through such special legislation as
the English law that declared fair and true reports of public
8
meetings to be qualifiedly privileged.
* LL.B., Willamette University (1909); J.D. (1920), LL.D., Loyola University (1929). Judge, United States District Court, Southern District, California. Author, It's Libel or Contempt If You Print It (1949); The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946); The New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure (1938);

Marriage and Divorce

(1937);

The Constitution and the

Future (1936); Notes on Common Law Pleading (1930); Essays in the Law
of Libel (1929); Handbook of California Pleading and Procedure (1926);
various articles in legal periodicals.
1. La Constitution Belge (1931) Art. 18, as quoted In Dicey, The Law of
the Constitution, 234-235 (7 ed. 1908): "Art. 18. La presse est Uibre; la censure
ne pourra jamais dtre dtablie: il ne peut 6tre exigd de cautionnement des
dcrivains, dditeurs ou imprimeurs.
"Lorsque l'auteur est eonnu et domicilid en Belgique, 1'editeur,1imprimeur
ou le distributeur ne peut etre pour-suivi."

2. Dicey, op. cit. supra note 1, at 243.
3. Libel Law Amendment Act, § 4 (1888) (51 & 52 Vict. c. 64).
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On the whole, however, the statement just quoted is a clear
summary, in one sentence, of the modern law of the press as
4
reflected in English and American law.
Whatever rights the editor or publisher of a newspaper enjoys
come to him not by reason of his calling, but as an individual
living in a free, democratic community.
While here and there a statute, such as the California retraction statute, 5 may confer a special benefit upon a newspaper, the
inclusion of newspapers in the National Labor Relations Act,6
and the Fair Labor Standards Act,7 and the refusal of the Supreme
Court of the United States to grant them exemption under these
laws," and to exclude news-gathering agencies from the provisions of the anti-trust laws,9 indicate that the attitude which
Dicey noted in England, at the beginning of the century, is still
dominant with us. The full application of the laws of libel and
contempt to newspapers expresses the same approach.
Nevertheless, in the unfoldment of the democratic process,
and the increasing appreciation of the importance of public scrutiny of acts of public officials and of matters of public interest,
a definite extension of the right to mirror and comment on such
acts has taken place.

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF LIBEL

The significance of this trend will be more apparent if we
advert to the fact that in the law of libel, the tendency is to
broaden the definition of libel so as to consider libelous statements which, by older standards, would not have been considered
such. Illustrative are the recent cases in which statements accusing a person of professing unpopular political views, such as
being a "Fascist" or a "Red," or "Fascist" or "Communistic" sympathizer, have been held to be libelous, even in states like California where communism is still recognized as a lawful political
party and where the courts have refused to take judicial notice
4. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 47(5).
5. Id. at § 48(a), which, at this writing, has been invalidated by the court
of appeals, Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 92 Cal.
App. 224 (1949).
6. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (1935).
7. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (1938).
8. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
9. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S 1 (1945).
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of the fact that the Communist Party advocates the forcible overthrow of the government. 10
Indeed, a great federal court, speaking through one of our
outstanding judges, Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, has held that accusing one of
being a representative of the Communist Party, even without
attributing to him personally the profession of its doctrine, was
libelous under the Law of New York. Referring to what had been
called "the right-thinking people's test," Judge Hand wrote:
"We do not believe, therefore, that we need say whether
'right-thinking' people would harbor similar feelings toward
a lawyer, because he had been an agent for the Communist
Party, or was a sympathizer with its aims and means. It is
enough if there be some, as there certainly are, who would
feel so, even though they would be 'wrong-thinking' people
if they did.""
What the courts are saying is that any epithet which, in the
minds of a definite segment of the people, might be considered a
reflection on the person is a libel. This is quite a departure from
the old rule which enjoined us that, in determining whether a
publication is libelous, we are to consider only the views of those
persons whose attitude commends itself to the approval of the
court. The newspaper and legal professions are familiar with
the group of cases instituted by Congressman Martin L. Sweeney
against many newspapers throughout the United States because
they published a Pearson and Allen column which charged him
with opposing the appointment of the then United States Attorney for Ohio as a federal district judge, for the sole reason that
he was "a Jew and one not born in kthe United States." It is estimated that the total damages asked was the sum of $7,500,000.00.
The divergent conclusions reached in two of these cases by
federal circuit courts which decided them under the laws of different states illustrate the tendency just mentioned and present
a striking contrast.
10. Washington Times Co. v. Murray 299 Fed. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Grant
v. Reader's Digest Assn., 151 F. 2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945); Wright v. Farm Journal,
158 F. 2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947); Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947);
Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (D.C. Wash. 1943); Communist
Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 888 (1942); Gallagher v. Chavalas, 48
Cal. App. 2d 52, 119 P. 2d 408 (1941); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.W,
2d 257- (1947); Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926).
11. Grant v. Reader's Digest Assn., 151 F. 2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Judge Biggs, of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
could see no libel in the statements:
"Can it be said that the words printed were such as
tended to expose the plaintiff as a private citizen to contempt,
ridicule, hatred or degradation of character? ...We conclude
that they are not. At the most, the appellant is charged with
being a bigoted person who, actuated by a prejudice of an
unpleasant and undesirable kind, opposed a foreign-born Jew
for a judicial appointment. Let us assume that it was stated
in the alleged libel that the plaintiff opposed the appointment
of a candidate simply because he was an Eskimo born above
the Arctic Circle. We think that this example makes obvious
the absurdity of the plaintiff's position." 12
But Judge Chase, of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
saw libel in the fact that liberty-loving people in a country dedicated to religious and racial freedom would be shocked by the
attitude of a public official who based his opposition to official
preferment on the religion or national antecedents of a candidate.
He wrote for the court:
"Those who hate intolerance are prone to regard the person
who believes in and practices acts of intolerance with aversion and contempt. And in these times when it is universal
knowledge that one foreign dictator gained his power by
practices which included large-scale, unreasonable Jewish
persecutions which have played an important part in making
his name an anathema in many parts of this country the publication of statements such as those alleged may well gain for
12. Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F. 2d 53, 55 (3rd Cir. 1942). In
one of the companion cases instituted in the state courts of Ohio, the court,
in holding that the publication was not libelous, used this language:
"To oppose a person for political reasons because he is a Methodist, a
Baptist, a Catholic, a Jew, or one foreign born, for a particular appointment,
does not carry the necessary implication that the person opposing is influenced by his own intolerance, any more so than does opposition to a qualified
person because he is of some other political party, or is in the declining years
of his life, or favors prohibition, or is of socialistic tendencies, or has had
capitalistic connections. . . . Our decision cannot be bottomed upon social

implications which might attach to such language, nor to its governmental
effect. It is not our province to approve or disapprove such argument, and

our holding in this case in no wise indicates that this court approves of
opposition to the appointment of a man to public office based on the religious
or social heritage of the proposed appointee. We merely hold that to publish
of a man that his opposition to a proposed appointee for office is based on

religious grounds and the fact that the candidate is of foreign birth, is not
libelous as a matter of law-e.g., per se." (Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 481, 25 N.E. 2d 471, 472 [1941]).
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the person falsely accused the scorn and contempt of the
right-thinking in appreciable numbers." 13
Students of the law of libel can hardly agree with this reasoning. Under it, the test of the most prejudiced may be made to
govern. And in a conservative religious community or a community in which many disapprove of divorce, a false statement
that a person is divorced might become actionable.
Nevertheless, such seems to be the direction which the law
of libel is taking at the present time. The object seems to be to
broaden the definition of libel so as to make it cover the most
generalized and even negative statements of disapproval of con4
duct or imputations on a person's character.1
II
ACTS OF PUBLIC PERSONS

When the broadening of the field of comment and criticism
of public officials and matters of public interest is considered
against this rather rigorous background, the strides we have
made in that direction will appear in their true significance.
It is not my object to consider here the liberal rule established
in California by the now famous Snively case, 15 and obtaining
in eight other states (Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, South Dakota and West Virginia), and which
makes comments on the acts of public officials and candidates for
public office, qualifiedly privileged, even when charging them
with crime. The inquiry will be limited to the problem of fair
comment.
The right of fair comment stems from the fundamental principle that any matter of public concern is a proper subject of dissemination and comment. In an old Massachusetts case, the principle was stated very succinctly: .
"The editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty,
of publishing-for the information of the public, fair and
reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon any13. Sweeney v. Schnectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F. 2d 288, 290 (2d
Cir. 1941).
14. This subject Is treated fully in my recently published book. See
Yankwich, It's Libel or Contempt If You Print It, 1-9, and illustrative cases
(Group B, 30-92) (1950).
15. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921). See
Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 14, at 305-330.
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thing which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest .
16
*.".."

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of West Virginia
16. Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 238 (1877).
Although the older American cases do not draw clearly the distinction
between fair comment and qualified privilege, the statement of the principle
just quoted has been accepted generally.
A more elaborate statement is found in Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114
Iowa 298, 304, 86 N.W. 323, 325 (1901):
"One who goes upon the stage to exhibit himself to the public, or who
gives any kind of a performance to which the public is invited, may be freely
criticised. He may be held up to ridicule, and entire freedom of expression is
guaranteed dramatic critics, provided they are not actuated by malice or evil
purpose in what they write. Fitting strictures, sarcasm, or ridicule, even,
may be used, if based on facts, without liability, in the absence of malice or
wicked purpose. The comments, however, must be based on truth, or on what
in good faith and upon probable cause is believed to be true, and the matter
must be pertinent to the conduct that is made the subject of criticism. Freedom of discussion is guaranteed by our fundamental law and a long line of
judicial decisions. As said in the Gott Case, supra, the editor of a newspaper
has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public,
fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which
is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter
of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged
communications, for which no action will lie without proof of actual malice.
See, also, Eastwood v. Holmes, 1 Fost. & F. 347. Paris v. Levy, 9 C.B. (N.S.)
342; Donaghue v. Caffey 1885, 53 Conn. 43, 2 Atl. 397; Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp.
355, Note. Surely, if one makes himself ridiculous in his public performances,
he may be ridiculed by those whose duty or right it is to inform the public
regarding the character of the performance. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434.
Mere exaggeration, or even gross exaggeration, does not of itself make the
comment unfair. It has been held no libel for one newspaper to say of another,
'The most vulgar, ignorant, and scurrilous journal ever published in Great
Britain.' Heriot v. Stuart, 1 Esp. 437. A public performance may be discussed
with the fullest freedom, and may be subject to hostile animadversions, provided the writer does not do it as a means of promulgating slanderous and
malicious accusations. O'Connor v. Sill, 1886, 60 Mich. 175, 27 N.W. 13; Davis
v. Duncan, L.R. 9 C.P. 396. Ridicule is often the strongest weapon In the
hands of a public writer; and, if it be fairly used, the presumption of malice
which would otherwise arise is rebutted, and it becomes necessary to introduce evidence of actual malice, or of some indirect motive or wish to gratify
private spite. There is a manifest distinction between matters of fact and
comment on or criticism of undisputed facts or conduct. Unless this be true,
liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed by the constitution is nothing
more than a name."
The article involved was a rather scathing denunciation of the performance of a theatrical team known as the "Cherry Sisters," which the Des
Moines Leader had reproduced from another newspaper, and which read:
"Effie is an old jade of 50 summers, Jessie a frisky filly of 40, and Addie,.
the flower of the family, a capering monstrosity of 35. Their long skinny
arms, equipped with talons at the extremities, swung mechanically, and anon
waived frantically at the suffering audience. The mouths of their rancid
features opened like caverns, and sounds like the wailings of damned souls
issued therefrom. They pranced around the stage with a motion that suggested a cross between the danse du ventre and fox trot,-strange creatures with painted faces and hideous mien. Elfte is spavined, Addie is
stringhalt, and Jessie, the only one who showed her stockings, has legs with
calves as classic in their outlines as the curves of a broom handle." (114 Iowa
298, 299, 86 N.W. 323, 325.)
While the court, in its decision, stressed privilege dependent upon absence
of malice, it is to be noted that the court declined (1) to find malice in the
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has stated the reasons for the distinction between private libels
and publications commenting on matters of public interest in
this language:
"The distinction between a statement with reference to
private gossip and a scandal and one concerning an act or
conduct of public interest is so palpable as to require no
elucidation. Consideration of peace and order between individuals calls for repression and punishment of false and
defamatory statements of fact concerning the private person.
There are equally cogent reasons for liberality of statement
in matters of public concern. A citizen of a free state having
an interest in the conduct of the affairs of his government
should not be held to strict accountability for misstatement
of fact, if he has tried to ascertain the truth and, on a reasonable basis, honestly and in good faith believes that the statements made by him are true." 17
Several California cases decided in the last two decades illustrate this distinction and the scope and nature of the protection
which courts have thrown around comment on matters of public
concern. They are especially important because they establish
firmly the principle that a charge of unfitness for office, whether
the person be a candidate for office or its occupant, even if
couched in extravagant language, is not libel. The following is
a summary of the imputations: The statement that the members of a city council "lacked that conscientious regard for the
city's interest which makes the public office a public trust," and
mere extravagance of the language, and (2) placed the burden of proving it
upon the plaintiff, and sustained a directed verdict, in the absence of
such proof.
So we have, in this case, an older example of a principle which in more
recent years came to be applied with greater clarity and which resulted in
the doctrine that fair criticism is not libel, which malice cannot turn into
actionable libel, a doctrine to be discussed further on in this article. See
Albert Woodruff Gray, All's Fair In Criticism, Editor and Publisher, Vol. 83,
No. 24, p. 20, June 10, 1950.
17. Bailey v. Charleston Mail Assn., 126 W. Va. 292, 306, 27 S.E. 2d 837, 844
(1943). This case also expresses in very succinct language the thought that
the rights which newspapers enjoy belong to any person on the same basis:
"The constitutional provision relative to the freedom of the press confers
no special privilege or right upon a publisher of a newspaper in relation to the

law of defamation. Any person has the same right as a publisher of a newspaper."
Almost identical language is found in Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping
News, 4 Cal. App. 2d 284, 287, 40 P. 2d 940, 941 (1935): "The law recognizes no
special privilege in a newspaper. The privilege of a newspaper is in nowise
different from that of any citizen of the community." This is the view held

by all American courts. See 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 1212.
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urging their recall;' 8 a publication questioning the motive of a
mayor and attributing his attitude toward a certain ordinance to
selfish motives and his aspirations to Congress; 19 a statement
impugning the motives of a member of the school board in opposing the establishment of student savings banks; 20 a questioning
of the sources of the wealth which had been accumulated in public
office while working on a small salary without making any intimation that it was acquired illegally; 21 a charge that certain
members of a city council "have neither the zeal nor the temperament to administer the business of the city." 22
18. Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 P. 2d 569 (1933).
19. Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal. App. 2d 284, 40 P. 2d
940 (1935).
20. Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P. 2d 761
(1942).
21. Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 186 P. 2d 737
(1947).
22. Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324, 265 Pac. 803 (1928).
A recent California case, Howard v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P. 2d 399 (1950), illustrates the trend to give
the broadest scope to the right of comment. A recall election was pending
in Glendale, California, for the removal of some city officials. The plaintiff,
Austin F. Howard, was chairman of the committee sponsoring the recall.
Donald E. Close, the minor son of W. E. Close, published in the Glendale
News-Press, a letter attacking the recall movement and Howard. The letter
contained the following language:
"In the light of what has already been said in opposition to the recall
and what I have added above, it cannot be denied that the recall movement
is entirely illegitimate, a mala fide attempt to discredit noble and honorable
officials who have served our city long and well. This sinister movement must
not be permitted to continue to malign the democratic foundations of our city
government. Mr. Howard and his entire recall committee have proved themselves a disgrace to Glendale, and it should be the desire of every citizen to
destroy this dangerous and unjust element by casting his vote against the

recall."
Howard sued the Closes, father and son, and the newspaper. Sustaining
the trial court which ruled that the article was not libelous, the court reaffirmed the distinction between attacks on individuals in their private capacity
and attacks on public men or persons engaged in public controversies,
saying:
"Publications by which it is sought to convey pertinent Information to the
public in matters of public interest are permitted wide latitude. In controversies of a political nature, in particular, the circumstances often relieve
statements, which might otherwise be actionable, of possible defamatory
imputations. Mere expressions of opinion or severe criticism are not libelous
if they clearly go only to the merits or demerits of a condition, cause or
controversy which is under public scrutiny, even though they may adversely
reflect upon the public activities or fitness for office of individuals who are
intimately connected with the principal object .of the attack. ...
"These familiar rules have direct application to elections for the recall of
public officials. (See Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270 [263 P. 812], recall of mayor
and city council; Taylor v. Lewis, supra, recall of city councilman.)
"The statements of the portion of the article protested by plaintiff were
prefaced by a reference to the parking meter issue and to the asserted fact
that the sponsors of the recall had made no specific charges or accusations
against the officials. It was asserted that no 'pointed' charges of misconduct
had been made against the councilmen, no proof offered to connect them with
the 'deplorable' conditions which plaintiff claimed to exist, and that plaintiff
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These cases range over a period of more than twenty years.
Nevertheless, the reasoning behind them was best stated in the
oldest of them, which also gives the limitations:
"The conduct of public officers being open to public criticism, it is for the interest of society that their acts may be
freely published with fitting comment or strictures .... The
right of criticism rests upon public policy and those who seek
office should not be supersensitive or too thin-skinned concerning criticism of their qualifications. (Newell on Libel
and Slander, 4th ed., p. 536) In commenting upon a published article of the character here involved the supreme
court of Nebraska used the following apt language: 'It relates
to the fitness of those who adhere to the ruling clique and
their conduct in office. It imputes no crime to them. It employs no degrading or insulting epithets toward them, but in
extravagant language denounces them as derelict in the duties
of their office, unfit, unfaithful, etc. This we understand a
political stump orator may do, and outside of ethics there is
no rule against using the pulpit for a like purpose. It would
be absurd to hold as libelous to say of a candidate for public
office that he was utterly unworthy of public confidence. To
maintain that proposition, all political arguments are advanced against a candidate. They are sometimes rambling
but the law does not undertake to punish the man who sums
them up in a single sentence.' (Arnold v. Ingram, 151 Wis.
had conceded as much. The concluding paragraph, which assumed the truth
of the preceding statements, appears to be only an expression of the opinions

and views of the author respecting the merits of the recall movement. It was
devoid of statements of fact. It denounced the recall movement, calling it
'illegitimate,' 'a mala fide attempt' to discredit the officials, a 'sinister movement,' and it referred to the recall committee as a 'disgrace to Glendale,'
and as a 'dangerous and unjust element' that must be destroyed by defeating
the recall. Considered with the preface, as the author said it should be, the
final paragraph merely enlarged upon the Idea that no sufficient cause was

being advanced for the recall of the councilmen. The justness and good faith
of the recall were questioned without any words casting doubt upon the

character of the members of the recall committee or the integrity, of their
actions apart from their active support of the recall.
"In the words of the court in Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 386 (22
P. 2d 569, 572), the article . . . 'does not charge anything that would follow
appellant into his private life and stamp him as dishonest or bring upon him
in the capacity of a private citizen the contempt of his fellows,' etc. This, we
take to be a proper test on a charge of libel of words spoken or written concerning those who are participating on one side or the other of a political
issue." (Howard v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 95 C.A. 2d 580, at

584-585.)
It is sufficiently clear that, despite some very strong language which could

readily have been interpreted as stating facts rather than comment, the Court
recognized the right to comment in Its widest scope.
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438, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 976, 138 N.W. 111). . .. In thus permitting criticism the law gives a wide liberty, there being an
honest regard for the truth. Within this limit public journals, speakers, and private individuals may express opinions
and indulge in criticism upon the character or habits-or
mental or moral qualifications of official candidates. (1 Cooley

on Torts, p. 443)

."

23

Recently the Louisiana legislature attempted to use Article 3,
Section 11, of the Louisiana Constitution to curb the freedom of
a New Orleans newspaper to comment on matters of public
concern.
The Constitution of Louisiana, Article III, Section 11, reads:
"Either House, during the session, may punish by imprisonment any person not a member who shall have been
guilty of disrespect, or disorderly or contemptuous behavior,
but such punishment shall not exceed 10 days for each
offense."
The general impression among students has been that the aim
of the section is to give to the legislature the power to punish
those who are guilty of direct contempt towards the legislature.
It was never thought that this gave to the legislature the power
to punish as contempt newspaper criticism of its conduct. How23. Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324, 329, 265 Pac. 803 (1928). And see A.L.I.,
Restatement of Torts, §§ 606-610 (1938); Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33
P. 2d 293 (1934); Steenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 P. 2d 907 (1936). One of

the broadest statements of this principle is contained in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Edgerton of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in another one of the Sweeney cases, Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F. 2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942):

"The cases are in conflict, but in our view it is not actionable to publish
erroneous and injurious statements of fact and injurious comment or opinion
regarding the political conduct and views of public officials, so long as no

charge of crime, corruption, gross immorality or gross incompetence is made
and no special damage results. Such a publication is not 'libelous per se.' ....

Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of
officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their
governors. Since Congress governs the country, all inhabitants, and not
merely the constituents of particular members, are vitally concerned in the
political conduct and views of every-member of Congress. Everyone, including
appellees and their readers, has an interest to defend, and anyone may find
means of defending it. The interest of the public here outweighs the interest

of appellant or any other individual. The protection of the public requires
not merely discussion, but information. Political conduct and views which
some respectable people approve, and others condemn, are constantly imputed

to Congressmen. Errors of fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental
states and processes, are inevitable. Information and discussion will be
discouraged, and the public interest in public knowledge of important facts
will be poorly defended, if error subjects its author to a libel suit without

even a showing of economic loss. Whatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate."
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ever, the State Senate of Louisiana cited David Stern, III, Publisher, and Clayton Fritchey, Editor, of the New Orleans Item
for writing an editorial saying the legislature acted as "trained
seals" and "lackeys of Governor Earl K. Long." 24
While the threat of imprisonment was not carried out and
the senate contented itself with rebuking the editor and publisher,
the action of the Louisiana senate, even if conceivably within the
wording of the Louisiana Constitution, goes counter to the trend
here discussed and could not be supported under the recent norms
introduced by the Supreme Court of the United States into con25
structive contempt and followed throughout the country.
III
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

The right of fair comment extends to whatever one exhibits
for public approval. A brief statement of the principle is contained in a case in which rather harsh criticism of a then famous
actress, Olga Nethersole, was declared to be within the scope of
the privilege. The article under consideration, in addition to
criticizing the type of plays in which the actress was appearing,
stated that one of the plays had been "hissed" in London and
that the actress "had hysterics." A jury verdict in her favor was
set aside by the higher court upon the ground that the article
did not exceed the limits of fair comment:
"When one offers a production or performance for public
exhibition, he submits it to fair and reasonable criticism, and,
unless the writer passes beyond the limits of such criticism,
his language cannot be held to be libelous. Whether or not
the falsity of such a statement tends to prove express malice
need not be considered here, for, even though the statement
as to the hissing of 'The Labyrinth' in London be untrue, it
cannot be considered as evidence of express malice in respect
to criticism which is otherwise fair and reasonable. The plays
all treat of illicit relations between the sexes. They all present
situations which suggest the yielding to animal passions. The
24. New Orleans Item, June 5, 1950.
25. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Times v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946); Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947); Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 67 A. 2d 497 (C.C. Md.

1949), certiorari denied by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 9, 1950. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). And see Yankwich,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 477-486, 509-528.
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life which they represent is not according to the universally
accepted standards of morality and decency of conduct. It
may be that intelligent and right-minded persons may take
different views as to the tendency of such plays, and as to
the policy of presenting them. Some may say that the picture
of the consequence of an evil life will deter people from
entering upon such a life. Others may say that such a representation gives knowledge of evil and suggests thoughts which
tend to wrongdoing. Still others may say if a play represents
any phase of life it should be judged wholly as a work of art.
There may be honest and fair criticism from either standpoint. The true test is whether the description of the plays
is fairly given, and whether the opinions expressed are such
as may be reasonably entertained and expressed by an honest
person. Judged by this test, there can be no doubt that the
criticism complained of is fair and reasonable, and the case
is not one where different minds may properly arrive at different conclusions in respect to its fairness and reasonableness." 26
Without going into further detail, it may be stated generally
that the right of fair comment protects comments on governmental affairs, on the conduct and administration of educational,
charitable, religious and public institutions and organizations and
of their officers and employees, on the administration of justice,
on public spectacles, plays, books, pictures, and, generally, on
matters in which the public has a substantial interest. It embraces,
in addition to persons actually in public life, and candidates and
applicants for public preferment or office, the conduct of persons
who, by their positions, and their appeals for approval-be they
actors, public men, public contractors, ministers, educators, players in various sports-have become a matter of concern and interest to the public.
IV
WHEN IS COMMENT FAIR?

At times, writers and writers of opinions, including some
which we have discussed here, use "qualified privilege" and "fair
comment" interchangeably. However, they are not the same. In
qualified privilege, the publication would be considered libelous
26. Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 137, 95
N.E. 735, 740 (1911). And see, A.L.I., Restatement of Torts, § 609 (1938).
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but for the existence of the privileged occasion. Or the publication is, in fact, libelous, but because it is uttered under circumstances which render it privileged, it is not actionable unless published with actual malice. A privileged publication is, therefore,
defamatory, but the privileged occasion immunizes it against
action.
In order that comment be fair, (1) it must be based on facts
truly stated, or, differently expressed, it must not misstate factsfor a comment cannot be fair when based upon facts not stated
truly. (2) It must not contain imputations of corrupt or dishonorable motives to the person whose conduct or work is criticized, except insofar as such imputations are warranted by the
facts. (3) It must be the honest expression of the writer's real
opinion.
Fair comment is essentially opinion based on facts.
In formulating these rules, courts have also stated the negative side of the problem. The elements of fairness are absent (1)
if the publication contains attacks on the motives and character
of the person, unrelated to the matters as to which the comment
or criticism relates, (2) if it discusses his private life as to matters
not connected with the work which is the subject of criticism, and
(3) if it accused him of crime or employs degrading or insulting
epithets, other than those necessary to characterize his unfitness
for, or unfaithfulness in, office.
The line between the permissible and the forbidden is difficult
to trace at times. And the courts, themselves, are not always
consistently successful in drawing it true. For, while, for instance,
in discussing a book, play or a public performance, the private
life of the author or performer may be entirely foreign to the
subject of the discussion, in commenting on the fitness of a man
for public office, be he an aspirant or occupant, his private life
and morals may have a very direct bearing upon his availability
for office. His observance of the higher decencies in his behavior
and relations with individuals, in his family or business life, his
observance of the accepted norms of fair, decent and honest conduct in private affairs may furnish a telling clue to his character.
For it is axiomatic that one who does not have a proper regard
for moral standards and those decorous rules of conduct which,
by common agreement, should obtain in one's personal relations
with one's fellowmen, is not likely to conform to those higher
standards of probity required of one in public office. A personal
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attack may, therefore, be an integral and essential part of fair
comment and receive legal sanction as such. The courts do but
lay down general rules, which are merely guideposts. And whether
a particular criticism exceeds the bounds of fairness is, ultimately,
determined by a consideration of each particular situation, taking
into account the exigencies of the situation and all the circumstances surrounding the act which is the subject of the comment
or criticism and making all converge around the fundamental test
of all protected criticism, that it be fair. And fairness in this, as
in other instances of which it is an element, is not an abstract but
a concrete concept. Its existence or non-existence depends upon
time, place, circumstances, and, chiefly, upon what, according to
those high standards of right conduct which our way of life recognizes, and which the courts apply, should obtain in a particular
instance.

V
THE WIDENING HORIZON OF CRITICISM

It is quite obvious that the horizon has widened and that the
realm of public criticism has been extended (1) by making privileged comments on public men, whether they occupy public office
or are aspirants for it, or have acquired a public character through
their activities and (2) by protecting certain types of discussions
as fair comment.2 7 To these should be added (3) the denial to
27. Indicative of the liberal attitude is a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, based on the law of Illinois, holding that an accusation of "unfairness to labor" against a national concern does not exceed the
limitations of fair comment (Montgomery Ward & Co. v. McGraw-Hill Pub.
Co., 146 F. 2d 171, 176 (7th Cir. 1944). The article charged the officials of the
company with refusal to recognize the union, to bargain with them, or to
make any concessions, that they had given the "brush-off" to representatives
of the United States Conciliation Services and-as to one of them, a Catholic
clergyman with the rank of Monsignor-that they had given him the "runaround." The court ruled that, on the whole, the article was no more than
an accusation of unfairness to. labor. In this way they could see no libel.
"If it were libelous simply to say of another that he is unfair to labor,
every picketer who carries a banner with such a legend would be guilty of
libel. To say that one is unfair to labor is not a statement of a fact, but of
an opinion. Likewise to say of one: you are reactionary, you are undemocratic, you are a nationalist, you are an isolationist, you are a New Dealer,
you are a Union Leaguer, you are opposed to labor, you are a coddler of
labor, is similarly to express an opinion. Calling one unfair to labor is no
different. All of these expressions spring from controversies on questions of
public interest."
A like liberal attitude is indicated in a recent decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Tobin v. Boston Herald Traveler Corp., 324
Mass. 478, 487, 87 N.E. 2d 116, 120 [1949]). The defendant on March 28, 1945,
had published in the Boston Herald the following article: "'Clear It With
Jimmy' Or Else-If you don't 'clear it with Jimmy' your chances of getting
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public men of the right of privacy.28 This was promulgated in
-California on November 18, 1949, in a case in which the court
recognized that when one becomes a public character, he relinquishes the right of privacy, so as to permit exploitation of his
life without any limitation as to time. The litigation turned
around a statement by Groucho Marx, the well-known comedian,
broadcast over the network of the American Broadcasting Company on a program known as "You Bet Your Life":
"I once managed a prize fighter, Canvas-back Cohen. I brought
him out here. He got knocked out and I made him walk back

to Cleveland."

29

Cohen, who had entered the prize ring as a professional boxer in
1933, and continued his ring career-a losing one-until 1939,
when he abandoned it, sued. The court held that the suit could
not be maintained because, as a professional boxer, he had waived
the right of privacy, which lapse of time did not reinstate. The
court said:
"A person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode
of life, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or character,
is said to become a public personage, and thereby relinquishes
anything out of this administration in the line of patronage are not good.
Jimmy is Gov. Tobin's younger brother and according to all available reports,
he rules the patronage with an iron hand and if you weren't right in the
election, your chances of getting a job can be discounted."
The plaintiff, James G. Tobin, brother of the then Governor of Massachusetts, Maurice J. Tobin, identified by the pleadings as the "Jimmy" referred
to in the article, brought action alleging that the article charged that he
"was soliciting and receiving bribes... and.., had committed serious wrongs
involving moral turpitude."
The trial court overruled the newspaper's demurrer to the complaint.
The higher court reversed upon the ground that the article was not defamatory, and ordered the demurrer sustained, and judgment for the newspaper
entered as to the count of the complaint which set forth the publication, saying: "The gist of the publication is that Governor Tobin was distributing
patronage on the basis of party affiliation or, at least, that such affiliation
was one of the factors to be considered, and that he had delegated to his
brother, the plaintiff, the matter of determining whether applicants for
patronage had the necessary qualifications in this regard. The statement in
the publication that the plaintiff 'rules the patronage with an iron hand'
added little or nothing when read in the light of the words following it,
namely, 'and if you weren't right in the election, your chances of getting a
job can be discounted.' That means no more than that the plaintiff was
rigidly enforcing the party affiliation requirement, alleged to be essential to
the obtaining of patronage. It does not impute wrongdoing or reprehensible
conduct to the plaintiff. The expression 'Clear it with Jimmy' used in the
publication has no invidious connotation. In its context it meant only that
patronage must 'clear' through the plaintiff."
28. Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 14, at 274-285.
29. Cohen v. Marx, 97 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705, 211 P. 2d 320, 321 (1949).
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a part of his right of privacy.... Applying the foregoing rule
to the facts in the present case, it is evident that when plaintiff sought publicity and the adulation of the public, he relinquished his right to privacy on matters pertaining to his professional activity, "and he could not at his will and whim withdraw himself like a snail into his shell and hold others liable
for commenting upon the acts which had taken place when
he had voluntarily exposed himself to the public eye. As to
such acts he had waived his right of privacy and he could not
at some subsequent period rescind his waiver." 30
Other courts have applied this principle with the utmost
liberality. A feature story in 1937, in The New Yorker, about one
who had been considered "a boy wonder" in 1910,31 and a contemporaneous comment on the life of a person who was a defendant in a nationally discussed sedition trial, 32 were both placed
outside the protection of the right of privacy. In the last case,
the court summed up the principle in this sentence:
"The right of privacy does not include protection from
publication of matter of legitimate public or general interest."
And this for the reason that
"one who becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or
general interest must pay the price of publicity through news
reports concerning his private life, unless those reports are
defamatory." s3
So, despite the tightening of the law of libel against the purveyor
of news in other respects, there has been a noted extension of the
realm of criticism and comment on public men and public matters.
This is a healthful sign, especially because there are strident
voices in our midst who would stifle, in true totalitarian manner,
all public criticism. While their avowed aim may appear praiseworthy and be couched in very high-minded language, the ultimate aim is to encompass all of what the Duke of Marlborough
referred to, in bitterness, as "the villainous way of printing."
Others imbued by the desire to help public free discussion in our
democratic society, would abolish the distinction between conditionally privileged publications and fair comment.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705, 211 P. 2d 321, 322.
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F. 2d 467 (App. D.C. 1946).
Id. at 468.
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A recent writer on the subject has stated:
"The most needed development . . is wider acceptance
of the rule that there is a conditional privilege to make misstatements of fact. Most of the uncertainty of the law arises
from the difficulty of disentangling comment, statements of
motives, and statements of fact; this uncertainty would be
avoided if all comments and statements about political officers
and candidates were conditionally privileged. Such a rule
would provide needed encouragement to those who wish to
speak out honestly and with due care in the public interest,
and the conditional character of the privilege would guarantee
adequate protection to officers and candidates." 34
The adoption of such rule might be of benefit in states which,
although recognizing the right of fair comment, do not recognize
the liberal rule of privilege which obtains in California and eight
other states in relation to men in, and candidates for, public office.
However, in the states where both are present, the abolition of the
distinction would not result in any great practical advantage.
And, even in other states, such reform might not be desirable.
As already noted, the chief distinction between the two is
that, in qualified privilege, the article would be libelous but for
the privilege, while fair comment is no libel.
In final analysis, however, both a privileged publication and
a publication which is claimed to be fair comment may have its
character destroyed by excess-in the one case by malice in fact,
in the other, by extravagant personal attacks not warranted by
facts. In the case of qualified privilege, a mere allegation, in a
complaint, of actual malice is enough to force a trial. In the case
of fair comment, the question whether the personal attack is warranted by the facts stated is one of law to be determined by the
court. In most instances, such a determination would terminate
the lawsuit. And the cases mentioned at the beginning of this
discussion indicate that this is what actually occurred.35 Only if
the facts on which the comment is based did not appear in the
publication and if the court ruled that the inference is not one
which should, under the circumstances, be made, would there be
a question of fact left for a jury. 36 And the instances in which
34. Noel, Defamation
875, 903 (1949).
35. See cases cited in
36. Yankwich, op. cit.
A very recent Illinois

of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev.
notes 18-23, supra.
supra note 14, at 319-322, 372-374.
case (Dilling v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co.,
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this would happen are likely to be less frequent under the present
state of the law.

VI
CONCLUSION

The two plagues which scourge the life of newspaper editor
and publisher-libel and contempt-are a challenge not only to
his ingenuity, but also to his sense of responsibility, without
which he cannot perform his true function in a free democratic
91 N.E. 2d 635, 637 [Il1. 1950]), decided on March 8, 1950, contains a very apt
illustration of the application of this principle.
The Chicago Herald-American had published a dispatch from San Jose,
California, stating that the California Legion had adopted a resolution which
charged that "Communists and Fascists continue to threaten our cherished
ideals of Americanism."
The dispatch stated that, among the persons named in the resolution
"as fostering subversive activities," was Elizabeth Dilling. She sued for libel.
The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint. On appeal, the
appellate court of Illinois sustained the ruling.
While adhering to the recently declared principle that the characterization of a person as a Communist or as an un-American disciple of Fascism
is libelous per se, the court ruled that the article did not amount to a charge
of either, saying: "Nowhere in the article complained of is there a statement
that plaintiff is a Communist or a Fascist or that she is an adherent of Communism or Fascism. All the article says about the plaintiff is that she is
named in the resolution as one who is fostering subversive activities. In our
opinion the language used does not charge plaintiff with the crimes of
treason or sedition, nor can the language of the published article be construed
as charging plaintiff with any crime." (91 N.E. 2d 635, 637.)
More significant to the problem we are discussing is the fact that the
court finding on the face of the complaint and in the publication that Elizabeth Dilling had been engaged in advocating publicly as a lecturer and
authoress certain doctrines, the publication of the dispatch and the dispatch
itself were no more than fair comment on her activities. The court said:
"In her complaint plaintiff alleges that she 'is a patriotic author and a
lecturer on behalf of Christianity and Americanism.'
"'One who by his activities and by written or spoken language attempts
to influence public opinion in any way is subject to the free and honest criticism of his efforts by members of the public. Thus, lobbyists and other persons
attempting to influence prospective legislation, propagandists seeking public
support for their causes, and various persons who participate in civic and
state activities, not as office holders or candidates therefor, but merely as
private citizens, are subject to the free expression of the opinion of those
commentators who honestly but disparagingly pass judgment upon their
activities.' A.L.I., Restatement of Law-Torts, vol. 3, sec. 610, p. 292.
"According to the allegations of her complaint, plaintiff sought public
support and patronage, thus inviting public criticism. The fact that defendants were reporting and commenting on a matter of public interest appears
from the complaint. Hence, defendants' right of fair comment in a matter of
public interest was properly presented for determination by their motion to
dismiss, and it was unnecessary to plead this right as an affirmative defense.
Manifestly the executive committee of the California American Legion does
not share plaintiff's views on Americanism. In our view this expression of
difference of opinion as reported in the article here complained of is not
actionable per se." (91 N.E. 2d 635, 637.)
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society. The Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press gave
expression to this thought when it wrote:
"Freedom of the press for the coming period can only
continue as an accountable freedom. Its moral right will be
conditioned on its acceptance of this accountability. Its legal
right will stand unaltered as its moral duty is performed." 37
To obtain the optimum of the wider scope of coverage and
criticism of public men and matters, which the courts now concede to the newspaper editor and writer, two cardinal rules should
be observed:
(1) Comment should be limited to what is essential to the
special situation. The unworthiness of a person may be shown
even though condemnation and exposure be confined to the characteristics which disqualify in the particular respect. Indeed,
such approach may be the more effective. And it is impossible to
stay in the realm of legitimate privilege or criticism if the writer
seeks to make a specific incident the occasion for giving vent to
unbounden wrath, righteous or other, or for dealing with all the
venal sins or peccadillos, of which the subject under attack may,
at one time or another, have been guilty, and which have no true
3
relation to the unfitness which it sought to expose. 8
37. Report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and
Responsible Press, 19 (1947) (Chairman, Robert M. Hutchins).
38. It is, often, very difficult to draw the exact boundaries of privileged
comment. Some of the older writers have sought to do it by postulating that
publications relating to "political views or arguments on questions of public
interest" shall not "attack the character of a person." (Newell, Slander and
Libel, 57, § 18 [4 ed. 1924]). ]But comment may, of necessity, be of such nature
as to call for invasion of the domain of private conduct. The Restatement of
Torts, while not approving the liberal rule, gives the following as the rule of
law obtaining at present:
"The privilege stated in this Section applies not only to discussion of the
public acts of officers and candidates, but no [sic] criticism of the private
conduct and the motives which affect their public acts.
"The fact that a person holds public office or is an employee of the public
does not throw his entire private life or character open to criticism. However,
his private conduct may be of public importance if it is such as to indicate
characteristics incompatible with the proper discharge of his public duties.
To this extent the private life of the public official may be subject to criticism. Thus, the fact that a man has in his private affairs shown himself to
be dishonest in his custody of other people's money is highly important in
determining his fitness for an office in which he has or will have the custody
of public funds. So, too, a, public officer's personal character as indicated
by his private acts may be of importance in determining his fitness for an
office since the fact that he acted for an improper purpose on one occasion
may properly be regarded as indicating that similar motives may influence
his official conduct. However, the privilege to criticise the private conduct or
character of a public official differs in one important particular from the
privilege to criticise the quality of his public acts. In the latter case it is
necessary to show only that the criticism expressed the actual opinion of the
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(2) Facts should be made to speak, and non-essential comments should be avoided-especially those fulminating epithets
so beloved of columnists and headline writers, which courts seize
upon so eagerly in order to pin "libel" on what might, otherwise,
have been protected comment.
In brief, editors and writers must be careful how they fling
about what Ambrose Bierce called "the splintering lightning and
the sturdy thunders of admonition." 39
Self-interest and a salutary sense of social responsibility and
accountability command such conduct.
critic. In the former, it is necessary to show not only this but also that the
opinion expressed by the criticism is one that is reasonably warranted by the
facts, that is, that it is one with which a man of reasonable intelligence and
judgment might agree." (A.L.I., Restatement of Torts, § 607.)
This is but an application of the principle that fair comment may include
a personal attack. See IV, supra; Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 14, at 317-322,
371-375.
39. Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, "Editor," in the Collected Writings of
Ambrose Bierce, 228 (Fadiman ed. 1946).

